{"title":"取代效果、效率效果與產品創新","authors":"廖郁萍 廖郁萍","doi":"10.53106/054696002022060111006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n 根據Arrow (1962) 率先提出的取代效果,既存獨佔廠商從事製程創新的動機較潛在進入廠商來得低 (不論創新之幅度)。根據Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 率先提出的效率效果,前者從事創新的動機較後者來得高 (非大幅度之創新) 或一樣高 (大幅度之創新)。本文採用Hotelling線性城市模型來描述新舊產品之差異 (水平和垂直),以探討既存獨佔廠商和潛在進入廠商從事產品創新之相對動機大小,且探討所獲致的結論是否不同於Arrow (1962) 和Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 所獲致的結論。數值分析結果顯示,此問題的答案為「是,且就性質上來說,是大幅度的不同」。關鍵原因有二。一與區分非大幅度創新和大幅度創新之標準有關,另一與獲取創新的既存獨佔廠商之選擇有關。\n The Arrow (1962) replacement effect shows that an incumbent monopolist has less incentive to pursue process innovations than a potential entrant, no matter what the innovation size. In contrast, the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) efficiency effect shows that the incumbent’s incentive to pursue a non-drastic innovation is higher and that both firms have equal incentives to pursue a drastic innovation. Hotelling’s linear city model is used in this study to describe horizontal and vertical differentiation between old and new products. The purpose is to examine the relative incentives of the incumbent monopolist vs a potential entrant to pursue product innovations and whether the results differ from those obtained by Arrow and those obtained by Gilbert and Newbery. The results of the numerical analysis show large qualitative difference. There are two key reasons for this; one is related to the criterion used to classify innovations as non-drastic or drastic, and the other is related to the innovating incumbent’s choice.\n \n","PeriodicalId":254216,"journal":{"name":"應用經濟論叢","volume":"333 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"應用經濟論叢","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53106/054696002022060111006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
根據Arrow (1962) 率先提出的取代效果,既存獨佔廠商從事製程創新的動機較潛在進入廠商來得低 (不論創新之幅度)。根據Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 率先提出的效率效果,前者從事創新的動機較後者來得高 (非大幅度之創新) 或一樣高 (大幅度之創新)。本文採用Hotelling線性城市模型來描述新舊產品之差異 (水平和垂直),以探討既存獨佔廠商和潛在進入廠商從事產品創新之相對動機大小,且探討所獲致的結論是否不同於Arrow (1962) 和Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 所獲致的結論。數值分析結果顯示,此問題的答案為「是,且就性質上來說,是大幅度的不同」。關鍵原因有二。一與區分非大幅度創新和大幅度創新之標準有關,另一與獲取創新的既存獨佔廠商之選擇有關。
The Arrow (1962) replacement effect shows that an incumbent monopolist has less incentive to pursue process innovations than a potential entrant, no matter what the innovation size. In contrast, the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) efficiency effect shows that the incumbent’s incentive to pursue a non-drastic innovation is higher and that both firms have equal incentives to pursue a drastic innovation. Hotelling’s linear city model is used in this study to describe horizontal and vertical differentiation between old and new products. The purpose is to examine the relative incentives of the incumbent monopolist vs a potential entrant to pursue product innovations and whether the results differ from those obtained by Arrow and those obtained by Gilbert and Newbery. The results of the numerical analysis show large qualitative difference. There are two key reasons for this; one is related to the criterion used to classify innovations as non-drastic or drastic, and the other is related to the innovating incumbent’s choice.
根据Arrow (1962) 率先提出的取代效果,既存独占厂商从事制程创新的动机较潜在进入厂商来得低 (不论创新之幅度)。根据Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 率先提出的效率效果,前者从事创新的动机较后者来得高 (非大幅度之创新) 或一样高 (大幅度之创新)。本文采用Hotelling线性城市模型来描述新旧产品之差异 (水平和垂直),以探讨既存独占厂商和潜在进入厂商从事产品创新之相对动机大小,且探讨所获致的结论是否不同于Arrow (1962) 和Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 所获致的结论。数值分析结果显示,此问题的答案为「是,且就性质上来说,是大幅度的不同」。关键原因有二。一与区分非大幅度创新和大幅度创新之标准有关,另一与获取创新的既存独占厂商之选择有关。 The Arrow (1962) replacement effect shows that an incumbent monopolist has less incentive to pursue process innovations than a potential entrant, no matter what the innovation size. In contrast, the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) efficiency effect shows that the incumbent’s incentive to pursue a non-drastic innovation is higher and that both firms have equal incentives to pursue a drastic innovation. Hotelling’s linear city model is used in this study to describe horizontal and vertical differentiation between old and new products. The purpose is to examine the relative incentives of the incumbent monopolist vs a potential entrant to pursue product innovations and whether the results differ from those obtained by Arrow and those obtained by Gilbert and Newbery. The results of the numerical analysis show large qualitative difference. There are two key reasons for this; one is related to the criterion used to classify innovations as non-drastic or drastic, and the other is related to the innovating incumbent’s choice.