On the Importance of the Philosophy of Well-being

T. Kwarciński
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Objective : A weak approach to well-being policy means that government’s goal should be to choose policies that make people better off over those that make them worse off, with other things being equal. The question is what kind of underlying assumptions should be fulfilled to achieve this goal. In particular, do policymakers have to agree on some substantive theory of well-being, like hedonism or objective list theory, or persist in choosing the formal preference satisfaction theory of well-being? According to Haybron and Tiberius (Well-being Policy: What Standard of Well-being?, “Journal of the American Philosophical Association” 2015, vol. 1, no 4), we can avoid raising such questions by drawing a strict distinction between the varieties of concepts or theories of well-being and policy processes aiming at promoting the well-being of citizens. They claim that such policies are “justified only when they are grounded in the conceptions of the well-being of those on whose behalf policy is being made”, and call this approach “pragmatic subjectivism” (p. 713). From their reasoning it follows that policymakers need not develop the appropriate concept of well-being, but can leave it to citizens to choose. The paper examines Haybron and Tiberius’ proposal and defends the claim that while theoretically we can avoid discussing the concept of well-being when we follow pragmatic subjectivism, we cannot do this in practice. Research Design & Methods : The paper uses an argument analysis. Findings : One way or another we will have to move in the direction of purely formalistic preference satisfaction theory or some substantive approaches like hedonism or objectivism. If we do not want to take for granted the incoherent intuitive concepts of well-being people hold, and because “well-being” is a normative concept, we have to develop philosophical theories of well-being that openly reveal their strengths and weaknesses. Implications  /  Recommendations : To facilitate the process of political decision-making, philosophically informed measures of well-being are needed. To a certain extent, those measures already exist, and they are widely applied by policymakers, e.g., GDP per capita, the Human Development Index or various happiness / subjective well-being indices. However, they seem to be either insufficient or purely philosophically informed. Contribution : The paper contributes to the development of the analysis of well-being and measures its philosophical underpinnings.
论幸福哲学的重要性
目标:福祉政策的弱方法意味着政府的目标应该是选择让人们过得更好的政策,而不是让他们过得更差的政策,在其他条件相同的情况下。问题是,为了实现这一目标,应该满足什么样的基本假设。特别是,决策者是否必须同意一些实质性的幸福理论,如享乐主义或客观清单理论,还是坚持选择正式的幸福偏好满足理论?根据Haybron和Tiberius(幸福政策:什么是幸福标准?)(《美国哲学协会杂志》2015年第1卷第4期),我们可以通过严格区分各种福利概念或理论和旨在促进公民福祉的政策过程来避免提出这些问题。他们声称,这种政策“只有在政策是为其利益制定的人的福利概念为基础时才有理由”,并把这种做法称为“实用主义主观主义”(第713页)。从他们的推理可以得出,政策制定者不需要制定适当的福利概念,而可以让公民选择。本文考察了Haybron和Tiberius的提议,并为以下观点辩护:虽然理论上我们可以在遵循实用主义主观主义时避免讨论幸福的概念,但在实践中我们无法做到这一点。研究设计与方法:本文采用论证分析法。研究结果:无论如何,我们将不得不朝着纯粹的形式主义偏好满足理论或一些实质性方法(如享乐主义或客观主义)的方向前进。如果我们不想把人们所持有的不连贯的直觉概念视为理所当然,并且因为“幸福”是一个规范的概念,我们必须发展出公开揭示其优点和缺点的幸福哲学理论。影响/建议:为了促进政治决策的进程,需要从哲学角度衡量福祉。在某种程度上,这些措施已经存在,并被决策者广泛应用,例如人均国内生产总值、人类发展指数或各种幸福/主观福祉指数。然而,他们似乎要么不够充分,要么纯粹是哲学知识。贡献:本文有助于福祉分析的发展,并衡量其哲学基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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