Criminal Discount Factors and Deterrence

G. Mastrobuoni, D. Rivers
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引用次数: 36

Abstract

The trade-off between the immediate returns from committing a crime and the future costs of punishment depends on an offender's time discounting. We exploit quasi-experimental variation in sentence length generated by a large collective pardon in Italy and provide non-parametric evidence on the extent of discounting from the raw data on recidivism and sentence length. Using a discrete-choice model of recidivism, we estimate an average annual discount factor of 0.74, although there is heterogeneity based on age, education, crime type, and nationality. Our estimates imply that the majority of deterrence is derived from the first few years in prison.
刑事折扣因素与威慑
犯罪的即时回报和未来惩罚成本之间的权衡取决于罪犯的时间折现。我们利用意大利大规模集体赦免产生的刑期长度的准实验变化,并从累犯和刑期长度的原始数据中提供关于折扣程度的非参数证据。使用累犯的离散选择模型,我们估计平均年折现系数为0.74,尽管存在基于年龄、教育、犯罪类型和国籍的异质性。我们的估计表明,威慑作用主要来自监狱的头几年。
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