The creativity mechanisms in embodied agents: An explanatory model

Abstract

In his recent writings, David Deutsch has argued that no progress in AGI is possible unless a breakthrough in philosophy will occur - a new epistemological theory explaining how brains create explanatory knowledge will be found. The purpose of the present paper is to present first ideas leading to such a theory within the framework of a high-level model of an embodied cognitive agent. In order to support creativity an agent must have the ability to draw and understand analogies which may be used in its otherwise standard reasoning processes in place of facts that served as the basis of the analogy. The use of analogies may then lead to the derivation of new explanatory knowledge in form of conjectures that can further become a subject of criticism, testing and adjustment or rejection. In the respective creative processes embodiment plays an indispensable role. We show that the existing model of an embodied cognitive agent designed recently by the author can serve as an explanatory model elucidating the mechanisms of creativity. Technically, the process of drawing analogies and their use in derivations of explanations can be seen as a means of mining new knowledge originally rooted in the environment. This can boost the computational power of cognitive systems above that of the classical Turing systems.