Organization as a Nexus of Rules: Emergence in the Evolution of Systems of Exchange

M. Boisot, R. Sanchez
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain the evolution of human systems of exchange through the emergence of both fundamental forms of organization (such as firms and markets) and specific instances of organization (such as individual firms and other economic or social entities) for engaging in exchange. We develop a combined systems, evolutionary, cognitive, and game-theoretic perspective on organizing that broadly represents organizations as systems of exchange founded on rules and routines for ordering exchange (broadly construed) between agents. We characterize the evolution of systems of exchange as an evolutionary cognitive process in which agents learn from their exchange experiences to adapt and improve rules and routines that improve the systems of exchange in which they participate. An evolutionarily stable form or instance of organization is achieved when a nexus of rules and routines emerges that offers a Pareto preferable system of exchange that attracts agents to its way of organizing exchange. We identify key aspects of rules that determine their relative attractiveness and thus their potential to be perceived as Pareto preferable by agents. We describe how trial-and-error learning by agents as they apply and seek to improve rules and routines in processes of exchange leads to the emergence of innovative forms of organizing (distinguished by their distinctive new nexus of rules) and to their dissemination, further evolution, and perhaps eventual extinction within a population of agents. We also distinguish the nexus-of-rules perspective on organization developed here from the nexus of contracts perspective common in the economic view of organization.
作为规则纽带的组织:交换系统演化中的涌现
本文试图通过参与交换的基本组织形式(如企业和市场)和特定组织实例(如个体企业和其他经济或社会实体)的出现来解释人类交换系统的演变。我们开发了一种结合系统、进化、认知和博弈论的组织视角,广泛地将组织代表为基于规则和惯例的交换系统,这些规则和惯例是主体之间有序交换的(广义解释)。我们将交换系统的进化描述为一个进化的认知过程,在这个过程中,代理人从他们的交换经验中学习,以适应和改进规则和惯例,从而改善他们参与的交换系统。当规则和惯例的联系出现时,一个进化稳定的组织形式或实例就实现了,它提供了一个帕累托优选的交换系统,吸引代理人以其组织交换的方式。我们确定了规则的关键方面,这些方面决定了它们的相对吸引力,从而决定了它们被代理人视为帕累托优选的潜力。我们描述了agent在应用和寻求改进交换过程中的规则和惯例时,如何进行试错学习,从而导致创新组织形式的出现(以其独特的新规则联系为特征),以及它们在agent群体中的传播、进一步进化,甚至最终灭绝。我们还将这里发展的组织规则联系观与组织经济学观点中常见的契约联系观区分开来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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