Elmo Zumwalt’s Project SIXTY: Driving Institutional Change in an Era of Great Power Competition at Sea

Abstract

In 1970, the U.S. Navy, for the first time in decades, found itself confronted by a rival capable of contesting the seas.1 For the new chief of naval operations (CNO), Admiral Elmo R. “Bud” Zumwalt Jr. (CNO 1970-74), the emergence of a powerful Soviet navy and the need recapitalize the fleet and close the widening gap in sea control capabilities in an era of budget cuts required drastic changes in U.S. naval strategy.2 Armed with an unwavering confidence in his ambitious vision, Zumwalt sought to overhaul the institution, modernizing it for a new era of naval (as well as budgetary) competition. From his perspective, the Navy had lost its way strategically. The Navy had splintered conceptually and materially. It was confused about its purpose and how to rationalize it. There was a lack of understanding of why fundamental changes in the security environment necessitated changing how the fleet was to be employed and what capabilities it needed. Zumwalt’s primary instrument for institutional strategic change called Project SIXTY. He gave his small, handpicked team sixty days (hence the