Judicial Branch and Political Crisis: Focusing on the Analysis of the Argumentation Structure of the President’s Impeachment Decision

Dongwook Cha
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Abstract

This study discusses on the presidential impeachment perceiving it as a constitutional device to overcome the internal political crisis - the loss of the president's control of state affairs - within the constitutional system. With so much power concentrated on the president, the president's vacancy can lead to a serious power vacuum. Whether this crisis can be resolved and turned into a stable phase is entirely left to the decision maker, the Constitutional Court. It might be wrong to leave the final judgment to the judicial branch even though the presidential impeachment is a political dispute. But the political nature of the presidential impeachment does not automatically make the Constitutional Court's decision political. Rather, the stronger the political character, the more faithful the Constitutional Court will try to be to the literary and logical interpretation based on normative principles. In the two presidential impeachment cases, the Constitutional Court used the principle of prohibition of excessive restriction, particularly balancing test, in the process of argumentation for conclusion.
司法部门与政治危机:以总统弹劾案论证结构分析为中心
本研究将总统弹劾视为克服宪政体系内部政治危机(总统对国家事务失去控制权)的一种宪法手段。由于如此多的权力集中在总统身上,总统的空缺可能会导致严重的权力真空。这场危机能否得到解决并进入稳定阶段,完全取决于宪法裁判所这一决策机构。虽然总统弹劾是一场政治纠纷,但把最终判决交给司法部门可能是错误的。但是,总统弹劾案的政治性质并不会自动使宪法法院的裁决具有政治性。相反,政治性越强,宪法法院就越会忠实于以规范性原则为基础的文学和逻辑解释。宪法裁判所在两起总统弹劾案中,在结论论证过程中运用了禁止过度限制的原则,特别是平衡检验原则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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