{"title":"Rorty, Habermas, and Radical Social Criticism","authors":"M. Bacon, Nat Rutherford","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-14","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we make three connected claims. First, despite Rorty’s expressed ‘bourgeois liberal’ reformism, there are philosophical resources within his political philosophy which indicate a latent programme of radical social criticism. Second, we argue against the charge that Rorty is a relativist who lacks the necessary foundations for social criticism by comparing the liberalisms of Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. Thirdly, we argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism would commit him, by his own lights, to engage in radical criticism of actually-existing liberalism. On this account of Rorty’s political philosophy, the idea that redescription of our social situation might take us beyond bourgeois liberalism becomes a real possibility.","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"464 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-14","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
In this chapter, we make three connected claims. First, despite Rorty’s expressed ‘bourgeois liberal’ reformism, there are philosophical resources within his political philosophy which indicate a latent programme of radical social criticism. Second, we argue against the charge that Rorty is a relativist who lacks the necessary foundations for social criticism by comparing the liberalisms of Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. Thirdly, we argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism would commit him, by his own lights, to engage in radical criticism of actually-existing liberalism. On this account of Rorty’s political philosophy, the idea that redescription of our social situation might take us beyond bourgeois liberalism becomes a real possibility.