Suspicious Minds and Views of Fairness

Abstract

Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions? As one typically cannot observe the strength or type of people's fairness view or their material incentives, inferring intentions from actions is a multidimensional inference problem. I study this problem by investigating intention attribution in a setting where the monetary incentives are easily identifiable: a redistribution choice of voting for either full redistribution or no redistribution. Individuals with above median incomes will have monetary incentives for no redistribution, and individuals with below median incomes will have monetary incentives for full redistribution. In a novel experimental design, participants predict how likely other participants' redistribution vote is motivated by selfishness. I find that participants are significantly more likely to attribute a no redistribution vote to selfishness if they view redistribution as fair. I define this effect, attributing actions not adhering to one's own fairness view to selfishness, as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to show how suspicious attribution can be explained by two other findings from the experiment: participants underestimate how many have a fairness view that differ from their own, projection bias, and overestimate the selfishness of participants with other fairness views, out-group stereotypes. My results and the idea of suspicious attribution can contribute to explaining polarization of attitudes and how prosocial individuals legitimize engaging in group conflicts.