EFFECTS OF BUS-BASED DISRUPTIVE BUSINESS MODELS WITH LIMITED CAPACITY ON RAIL MONOPOLIES: SOCIAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS

Alessandro Avenali, M. Gregori, P. Reverberi
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Abstract

Long distance passenger transport markets are facing important changes as new entrants, e-Platform based Bus Services Retailer (PBSR) operators, are challenging the railways incumbents applying judo economic strategies. Traditionally, European policy makers tended to favour railways services over road services in the long-haul markets, often leading the rail operators in monopolistic-alike positions. Recently, several countries deregulated their national intercity bus markets, gradually introducing intermodal competition in the sector. The competition led to important improvements on services quality, but it also had negative impacts on rail operators’ profitability, especially after PBSR operators started to work, due to their disruptive business model based on aggregative online platforms and production externalization. PBSR companies (e.g. Flixbus, BlaBlaBus) are characterized by high flexibility and low production costs, which use as advantage against the incumbents. The rail operators are instead characterized by high indivisibility, high production costs and, usually, big sizes. Losses in either revenues or market shares could easily forced them into reducing services quantity or even exit the market. Our paper aims to analyse these new competitive relations in the intercity intermodal market, focusing on resulting impacts on market shares, demand satisfaction and social welfare. Since the bus operators present limited capacity due to technical feasibility (e.g. minimum headway) and the need to limit road congestion (to preserve service quality), the mobility right fulfilment is put in jeopardy. We modelled the competitive relations through game theory, excluding high speed rail from the perimeter to preserve services comparability. Profits level and optimal social welfare are then studied through simulations. Results confirm that for increasing PBSR production capacity, railway operators tend to have fewer profits or be forced to leave the market, resulting in unsatisfied demand. Furthermore, from a social point of view, the rail monopoly seems to be, under specific circumstances, preferred to a duopoly.
以有限容量的公共汽车为基础的颠覆性商业模式对铁路垄断的影响:社会福利影响
长途客运市场正面临着重要的变化,新进入者,基于电子平台的巴士服务零售商(PBSR)运营商,正在挑战现有的铁路运营商运用柔道经济战略。传统上,欧洲政策制定者倾向于在长途市场上支持铁路服务,而不是公路服务,这往往使铁路运营商处于类似垄断的地位。最近,一些国家解除了对其国内城际巴士市场的管制,逐步在该部门引入多式联运竞争。竞争导致了服务质量的重要改善,但也对铁路运营商的盈利能力产生了负面影响,特别是在PBSR运营商开始工作之后,由于他们基于聚合在线平台和生产外部化的颠覆性商业模式。PBSR公司(如Flixbus, BlaBlaBus)的特点是高灵活性和低生产成本,这是对现有企业的优势。相反,铁路运营商的特点是高度不可分割,生产成本高,通常规模大。收入或市场份额的损失很容易迫使它们减少服务数量,甚至退出市场。本文旨在分析城际多式联运市场中这些新的竞争关系,重点分析其对市场份额、需求满意度和社会福利的影响。由于巴士营办商在技术上的可行性(例如最小车头时距)和限制道路挤塞(以保持服务质素)的需要,使其运载能力受到限制,因此,落实流动权受到威胁。我们通过博弈论建立了竞争关系模型,排除了周边的高速铁路,以保持服务的可比性。然后通过仿真研究了利润水平和最优社会福利。结果证实,为了提高PBSR的产能,铁路运营商往往会减少利润或被迫离开市场,导致需求得不到满足。此外,从社会角度来看,在特定情况下,铁路垄断似乎比双头垄断更可取。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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