Biofuel Mandating and the Green Paradox

S. J. Okullo, F. Reynès, M. Hofkes
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

The theory on the green paradox has focused primarily on the consumption of a clean substitute produced using a static technology. In reality, we observe the gradual accumulation of the clean substitute’s capacity, suggesting that supply decisions for the clean substitute and finite carbon resource should both be treated as dynamic. This paper shows that when climate policy is preannounced, and with simultaneous consumption of a finite carbon resource and a clean substitute, myopia in the supply of the latter leads to the green paradox. When clean substitute producers can accumulate capacity and are forward looking, the green paradox may or may not arise, however. In this setting, its occurrence depends on both the size of the discount rate and the remaining stock of carbon resource. These and other drivers of the green paradox are investigated in a multi-producer game-theoretic model calibrated to real-world global oil market data. The timing of mandating policy is shown to be the single most important variable for mitigating the green paradox. Moreover, for EU-2020 and US-2022 style biofuel mandating targets, a rather robust 0.3% decline in production is observed during the premandate phase, suggesting that concerns over the green paradox may be seriously overstated.
生物燃料强制与绿色悖论
关于绿色悖论的理论主要关注使用静态技术生产的清洁替代品的消费。在现实中,我们观察到清洁替代品的容量逐渐积累,这表明清洁替代品和有限碳资源的供应决策都应该被视为动态的。本文表明,当气候政策预先公布,同时消耗有限的碳资源和清洁的替代品时,后者的供应短视导致绿色悖论。然而,当清洁替代生产商能够积累产能并具有前瞻性时,绿色悖论可能会出现,也可能不会出现。在这种情况下,其发生取决于贴现率的大小和碳资源的剩余存量。在一个多生产商博弈论模型中,对这些和其他绿色悖论的驱动因素进行了研究,该模型校准了现实世界的全球石油市场数据。实施政策的时机被证明是减轻绿色悖论的最重要的变量。此外,对于欧盟-2020和美国-2022类型的生物燃料强制目标,在强制前阶段观察到相当强劲的0.3%的产量下降,这表明对绿色悖论的担忧可能被严重夸大了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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