Religion and Party Politics in India and Pakistan

S. Wilkinson
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Abstract

Until the 1990s, religious influence on party politics in India and Pakistan was primarily through street protests and pressure on mainstream nonreligious parties rather than by religious parties winning power directly. In India, such influence was constrained by the secular constitutional structure and the dominant role of the Congress Party. In Pakistan, however, politically deinstitutionalized parties, weakened by military interference, have never been strong enough to take on the clerics. Instead, party leaders and military regimes have increasingly tried to co-opt or accommodate Islamist parties and pressure groups to strengthen their own positions. Civilian and military governments in the 1970s and 1980s institutionalized much of the Islamist agenda within the state in a way that now seems impossible to reverse. Ironically, the very fact that much of the Islamist agenda is now institutionalized, makes it difficult for Islamist parties to expand much beyond the 10–20% of the votes they now receive. India’s secular consensus, which many observers saw as its greatest achievement, has been profoundly disrupted by the decline of the Congress Party over the past three decades and the rise of the BJP, headed by the dominant figure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has deep roots in the Hindu Nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and its Hindu nationalist family (Sangh Parivar) of organizations. Modi, especially in his second term (2019–), has used his majority in parliament to try to radically remake India along Hindu nationalist lines, even though that was not central to his campaign platform, nor the reason why most development- and governance-minded voters elected him to office.
印度和巴基斯坦的宗教和政党政治
直到20世纪90年代,宗教对印度和巴基斯坦政党政治的影响主要是通过街头抗议和对主流非宗教政党的压力,而不是宗教政党直接赢得权力。在印度,这种影响受到世俗宪法结构和国大党主导地位的限制。然而,在巴基斯坦,政治上非制度化的政党,由于军事干预而被削弱,从来没有强大到足以挑战神职人员。相反,政党领导人和军事政权越来越多地试图拉拢或迁就伊斯兰政党和压力团体,以巩固自己的地位。20世纪70年代和80年代的文官政府和军人政府,以一种现在看来不可能逆转的方式,将伊斯兰主义议程的大部分制度化。具有讽刺意味的是,伊斯兰主义议程的大部分现在已经制度化,这使得伊斯兰政党很难在他们现在获得的10-20%的选票之外扩大。印度的世俗共识被许多观察家视为其最伟大的成就,但在过去三十年里,国大党的衰落和印度人民党的崛起深刻地破坏了世俗共识。人民党由总理纳伦德拉·莫迪(Narendra Modi)领导,他深深扎根于印度教民族主义者拉什特里亚·斯瓦扬sevak Sangh及其印度教民族主义家族组织(Sangh Parivar)。莫迪,特别是在他的第二个任期(2019年-),利用他在议会中的多数席位,试图沿着印度教民族主义路线彻底重塑印度,尽管这不是他竞选纲领的核心,也不是大多数关注发展和治理的选民选举他的原因。
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