CHALLENGES THE AGENDA OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF LAW AND THE NATURE OF LAW

Chauhan Sunita Ramkunwar Singh
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Abstract

Although these are all valuable cautions to recognize before plunging headlong into the enterprise of searching for the necessary and sufficient conditions of the concept of law, they are no more than cautions. All of these cautions presuppose contested questions about the nature of concepts and about how we might go about recognizing and explaining them, and while it is important to recognize the con-tested nature of some of the assumptions, it is nevertheless far from unreasonable to engage in conceptual analysis of the concept of law on the assumption that there is a concept to be analyzed, and that the analysis will yield a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for application of the concept. This too may not be so, and it is possible that law is such a diverse, loose, and shifting array of phenomena that there is no interesting nature of law itself, and no interesting concept of law. Nevertheless I assume not only that there are concepts, and not only that they can be analyzed in terms of their necessary or essential properties, but also that there is a concept of law and that the concept of law is one of the concepts that can be so analyzed. This does not follow necessarily from the previous assumptions. It is possible that there are concepts susceptible to philosophical analysis but that the concept of law is not one of them. But I assume the contrary, and thus assume the possibility and even the value of conceptual analysis of the concept of law.
挑战法律概念和法律本质的概念分析议程
尽管在一头扎进寻找法律概念的必要和充分条件的事业之前,这些都是有价值的警告,但它们只不过是警告。所有这些警告假定有争议问题的本质概念和关于我们如何去认识和解释,而重要的是要认识到con-tested性质的一些假设,它仍然是远不合理进行概念分析法律概念的假设有一个概念进行了分析,并且分析将产生一组应用程序概念的充分必要条件。这也可能并非如此,法律可能是如此多样化、松散和变化的现象阵列,以至于法律本身没有有趣的性质,也没有有趣的法律概念。然而,我认为不仅存在概念,不仅可以根据它们的必要或本质属性来分析它们,而且还存在法律概念,并且法律概念是可以这样分析的概念之一。这并不一定是从先前的假设中得出的。有可能存在一些概念可以进行哲学分析,但法律概念不在其中。但我的假设正好相反,从而假设了法律概念的概念分析的可能性甚至价值。
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