On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital Goods

S. Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, A. Srinivasan
{"title":"On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital Goods","authors":"S. Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, A. Srinivasan","doi":"10.1145/2517148","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed by Goldberg et al. [2001]. This auction has been analyzed by Feige et al. [2005], who have shown that it obtains in expectation at least 1/15 fraction of the optimal revenue, which is substantially better than the previously proven constant bounds but still far from the conjectured lower bound of 1/4. In this article, we prove that the aforementioned random sampling auction obtains at least 1/4 fraction of the optimal revenue for a large class of instances where the number of bids above (or equal to) the optimal sale price is at least 6. We also show that this auction obtains at least 1/4.68 fraction of the optimal revenue for the small class of remaining instances, thus leaving a negligible gap between the lower and upper bound. We employ a mix of probabilistic techniques and dynamic programming to compute these bounds.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"188 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517148","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed by Goldberg et al. [2001]. This auction has been analyzed by Feige et al. [2005], who have shown that it obtains in expectation at least 1/15 fraction of the optimal revenue, which is substantially better than the previously proven constant bounds but still far from the conjectured lower bound of 1/4. In this article, we prove that the aforementioned random sampling auction obtains at least 1/4 fraction of the optimal revenue for a large class of instances where the number of bids above (or equal to) the optimal sale price is at least 6. We also show that this auction obtains at least 1/4.68 fraction of the optimal revenue for the small class of remaining instances, thus leaving a negligible gap between the lower and upper bound. We employ a mix of probabilistic techniques and dynamic programming to compute these bounds.
论数字商品的随机抽样拍卖
在数字商品拍卖的背景下,Goldberg等人[2001]提出了一种有趣的随机抽样拍卖。Feige等人[2005]对这种拍卖进行了分析,他们表明,它在预期中至少获得了最优收益的1/15部分,这大大优于先前证明的常数边界,但仍远低于推测的下限1/4。在这篇文章中,我们证明了前面提到的随机抽样拍卖,对于一大类高于(或等于)最优销售价格的出价至少为6个的实例,至少获得了最优收益的1/4。我们还表明,对于剩余的一小部分实例,这种拍卖至少获得了最优收益的1/4.68,因此在下限和上限之间留下了可以忽略不计的差距。我们混合使用概率技术和动态规划来计算这些边界。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信