Informed Dissent: Toward a Constitutional Right to Know

Martin E. Halstuk, Benjamin W. Cramer
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Abstract

This article argues that the American judiciary should recognize a constitutional right of access to government information, or more forcefully a “right to know”, for purposes of achieving the self-government that was envisioned by the Founding Fathers. This in turn will subject political leaders to the “consent of the governed” that was also envisioned by the nation’s early theorists. While no such right is stated explicitly in the Constitution, a right to know is implied by Congressional investigative responsibilities that are delineated in the Constitution, particularly in Article II; the idea is also supported by numerous Supreme Court precedents on the rights of citizens to access information on government activities, either directly by request or indirectly via the press, which itself has important privileges and responsibilities granted by the First Amendment. A constitutional right to know has also been theorized by several influential First Amendment scholars. This article’s thesis builds upon the consent of the governed ideal advanced by philosopher John Locke, whose influence on the Founding Fathers is well documented. The consent of the governed requires access to information, thus leading to the informed consent that must be acknowledged by political leaders who operate under the oversight of the public. Furthermore, this article argues that informed consent can encourage informed dissent, or the ability of citizens to criticize unsatisfactory leaders and to call for change in the press and at the ballot box. In more precise terms, information leads to thought, which leads to the speech and expression that is protected by the First Amendment, which then leads to informed dissent, and finally to political action. This process, fueled by obtainable government-held information, enables the self-government that is at the heart of the American Constitution.  
知情异议:走向宪法知情权
本文认为,为了实现国父们所设想的自治,美国司法部门应该承认宪法赋予公民获取政府信息的权利,或者更有力地说是“知情权”。反过来,这将使政治领导人服从于“被统治者的同意”,这也是美国早期理论家所设想的。虽然宪法中没有明确规定这种权利,但国会的调查责任隐含着知情权,这是宪法,特别是第2条所规定的;这一想法也得到了最高法院关于公民获取政府活动信息权利的众多先例的支持,无论是直接通过请求还是间接通过新闻界,新闻界本身具有第一修正案赋予的重要特权和责任。宪法知情权也被一些有影响力的第一修正案学者理论化。本文的论点建立在哲学家约翰·洛克(John Locke)提出的受治理理想的认同之上,洛克对美国开国元勋的影响有据可查。被统治者的同意需要获得信息,从而导致在公众监督下运作的政治领导人必须承认的知情同意。此外,本文认为,知情同意可以鼓励知情异议,或公民批评不满意的领导人的能力,并在新闻界和投票箱中呼吁变革。更准确地说,信息导致思想,思想导致受第一修正案保护的言论和表达,然后导致知情的异议,最终导致政治行动。这一过程在政府掌握的可获得信息的推动下,实现了作为美国宪法核心的自治。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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