The UDF in the 1990s

Abstract

The principal dynamic of the French party system under the Fifth Republic has been that of the so-called ‘bipolar quadrille’. By the end of the 1970s, four parties of approximately equal strength were monopolising over 90 per cent of the vote in their respective left and right blocs (Parodi, 1989). Nevertheless, this end-state had taken twenty years to produce, concluding in 1978 with the formation of the UDF. The UDF managed to create an unprecedented alliance between liberal, Christian democrat and radical currents,1 taking its place as the second right-wing pole next to the Gaullist RPR. The UDF represented the desire to institutionalise the centrist coalition formed around Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who had been elected president four years earlier. At the same time, however, none of the constituent parties of the new confederation had ever agreed to merge themselves into a single organisational entity.2 It was only on 16 May 1998, by a single motion passed by its national congress, that DL ended twenty years of the ‘moderate alliance’ by withdrawing from the confederation.3 DL represented the largest component of the UDF, accounting for around one-third of its members and elected representatives. Its separation allowed the creation of a significant new party, even if some of its members did not defect from the UDF. With a parliamentary group of 44 deputies in the National Assembly, together with 46 senators,4 DL immediately asserted itself as an indispensable partner. These events by no means marked the end of the UDF, but the secession did significantly alter its format. Lacking one-third of its former activists and a large chunk of its liberal wing, the balance of power noticeably shifted within the UDF. In particular, the descendants of the Christian democrat courant have become the dominant force. From this, a fusion of the remaining components into the New