W. Gornall, Oleg R. Gredil, Sabrina T. Howell, Xing Liu, Jason Sockin
{"title":"Do Employees Cheer for Private Equity? The Heterogeneous Effects of Buyouts on Job Quality","authors":"W. Gornall, Oleg R. Gredil, Sabrina T. Howell, Xing Liu, Jason Sockin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3912230","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine how private equity investments affect job quality. Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) – unlike standard M&A or growth equity deals – reduce employee satisfaction with compensation, work-life balance, firm culture, and senior management. These effects are driven by longer-tenured and lower-skill workers, and by high-leverage deals. However, reported pay is unaffected for most workers, while managers earn substantially more incentive pay. Using deal-level cash-flow return data, we find that LBOs have more IRR pass-through to employee satisfaction than mimicking public equity investments, with 1% higher IRR associated with 0.7% more incentive pay. Overall, LBOs appear to lead to both more rent-sharing with employees and increased job insecurity, particularly in high-leverage deals.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"55 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912230","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
We examine how private equity investments affect job quality. Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) – unlike standard M&A or growth equity deals – reduce employee satisfaction with compensation, work-life balance, firm culture, and senior management. These effects are driven by longer-tenured and lower-skill workers, and by high-leverage deals. However, reported pay is unaffected for most workers, while managers earn substantially more incentive pay. Using deal-level cash-flow return data, we find that LBOs have more IRR pass-through to employee satisfaction than mimicking public equity investments, with 1% higher IRR associated with 0.7% more incentive pay. Overall, LBOs appear to lead to both more rent-sharing with employees and increased job insecurity, particularly in high-leverage deals.