Stock Grants as a Commitment Device

Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas F. Cooley, Cheng Wang
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引用次数: 21

Abstract

A large and increasing fraction of the value of executives' compensation is accounted for by security grants. However, in most models of executive compensation, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a sequence of state-contingent cash payments. Security awards are redundant. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compensation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long-term contracts. We show that, in this environment, if stock grants are not used, then the optimal contract collapses to a series of short term contracts. When stock grants are used, however, nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve better risk-sharing and higher firm value.
股票授予作为一种承诺手段
在高管的薪酬价值中,有很大一部分是安全津贴,而且还在不断增加。然而,在大多数高管薪酬模型中,最优分配可以通过一系列国家条件现金支付来实现。安全奖是多余的。在本文中,我们建立了一个管理层薪酬的动态模型,其中公司和经理都不能承诺长期合同。我们表明,在这种环境下,如果不使用股票授予,那么最优合同将崩溃为一系列短期合同。然而,当使用股票授予时,可以实施非线性跨期方案,以实现更好的风险分担和更高的公司价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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