Irrationality

A. Gregory
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Abstract

This chapter replies to one common objection to desire-as-belief: that it makes poor sense of practical irrationality such as akrasia. This objection to desire-as-belief is closely related to two others: the worry that we sometimes desire to do things without believing we have reason to pursue them, and the worry that we sometimes believe we have reason to pursue things without desiring to do them. The chapter offers a series of complementary responses to these objections: that our beliefs can be irrational, that some of what we say about our desires is misleading, and that we might fail to be motivated by our desires. Between these factors, it is doubtful that such objections succeed. The chapter finishes with a brief aside on second-order desires, and concludes that they are of little relevance to the occurrence of akrasia.
非理性
这一章回应了对“欲望即信念”的一个普遍反对意见:即它对实际的非理性(如akrasia)没有什么意义。这种反对欲望即信念的观点与另外两种观点密切相关:一种担忧是,我们有时渴望做某事,但不相信我们有理由去追求它;另一种担忧是,我们有时相信我们有理由去追求某事,但不希望去做。这一章对这些反对意见提供了一系列补充的回应:我们的信念可能是非理性的,我们所说的一些关于我们的欲望是误导的,我们可能不会被我们的欲望所激励。考虑到这些因素,这种反对能否成功令人怀疑。本章以对二阶欲望的简短旁白结束,并得出结论,它们与akrasia的发生几乎没有关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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