Differential Information Economies and Incomplete Markets

K. Pronin
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Abstract

In a pure exchange economy with differential information, there may be ex-post Pareto-dominant core allocations which are not attainable as rational expectations equilibria because of information verifiability issues. On the other hand, many of the core allocations in the differential information economy do not seem realistic, given incentive constraints. This fundamental tension between missed trading opportunities and moral hazard will be explored using concepts from cooperative game theory and financial economics.

差异信息经济与不完全市场
在具有差异信息的纯交换经济中,可能存在由于信息可验证性问题而无法作为理性预期均衡实现的后帕累托主导核心分配。另一方面,考虑到激励约束,差别信息经济中的许多核心分配似乎并不现实。错失交易机会和道德风险之间的基本紧张关系将使用合作博弈论和金融经济学的概念进行探讨。
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