Research on Bilateral Games Between Electric Generations and Sale Sides With Incomplete Information

Huang He, Wu Jie, Wen Beibei, Wu Qian
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

With the deepening of the electric power system reform, electricity market has attracted attentions from both academic and industrial societies. In this paper, a bilateral game model with incomplete information between the electricity generation and selling enterprises is established, which considers the direct electricity purchase prices and amount as the strategy sets of the both sides. In order to forecast the direct electricity purchase prices, the factor of generation costs is introduced, which uses the co-integration theory to construct the relation between the direct electricity purchase prices and the generation costs. Furthermore, to forecast the direct electricity purchase amount, the similar days method is adopted to ensure the information sharing demand between both sides. Finally, the equilibrium solution of the bilateral game is obtained by using Nash equilibrium, and the model has been proved by simulation.
不完全信息下发电商与销售方的双边博弈研究
随着电力体制改革的不断深入,电力市场问题引起了学术界和产业界的广泛关注。本文以直接购电价格和购电量作为双方的策略集,建立了发电企业和售电企业之间的不完全信息双边博弈模型。为了预测直购电价,引入发电成本因素,运用协整理论构建直购电价与发电成本之间的关系。在预测直购电量时,采用相似天数法,保证了双方的信息共享需求。最后利用纳什均衡得到了双边博弈的均衡解,并通过仿真对模型进行了验证。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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