{"title":"Fixed Effects Spatial Panel Data Model with Time-Varying Spatial Dependence: An Application to Regional Expenditure Competition in China","authors":"Juncong Guo, X. Qu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3364261","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"To analyze the variation of spatial spillover effects over time as well as control unobserved individual-specific features, we extend the fixed effects spatial panel data model by introducing time-varying spatial dependence. For estimation, we propose a two-stage least squares method and the quasi-maximum likelihood approach. Finite sample properties of these two methods are investigated through Monte Carlo simulations. We apply the model to study the expenditure competition among county-level governments in China from 2002 to 2016. Our empirical findings show that the downward pressure of the economy in 2007-2008 and 2015 may lead to stronger competition. Central government regulation on official assessment after 2013 may cause weaker competition.","PeriodicalId":132067,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Development) (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Public Spending (Development) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3364261","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
To analyze the variation of spatial spillover effects over time as well as control unobserved individual-specific features, we extend the fixed effects spatial panel data model by introducing time-varying spatial dependence. For estimation, we propose a two-stage least squares method and the quasi-maximum likelihood approach. Finite sample properties of these two methods are investigated through Monte Carlo simulations. We apply the model to study the expenditure competition among county-level governments in China from 2002 to 2016. Our empirical findings show that the downward pressure of the economy in 2007-2008 and 2015 may lead to stronger competition. Central government regulation on official assessment after 2013 may cause weaker competition.