Political Competition and Rule-Based Financing in the Municipal Bond Market

Marian W. Moszoro
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Abstract

I study the link between the choice of rule-based contracts and political competition through the municipal bond market. I provide evidence that when the probability of losing office is high, mayors are more likely to issue revenue bonds over general obligation bonds and to choose competitive bidding over negotiated sales. This relationship can help explain trends in public financing and spending. The choice of revenue bonds and competitive bidding insulates public officials from referendum checks and allegations of impropriety but requires higher interest rates and administrative costs.
市政债券市场的政治竞争与规则融资
我通过市政债券市场研究了基于规则的合同选择与政治竞争之间的联系。我提供的证据表明,当失去职位的可能性很高时,市长更有可能发行收入债券而不是一般义务债券,更有可能选择竞争性投标而不是谈判销售。这种关系有助于解释公共财政和支出的趋势。选择税收债券和竞争性招标可以使公职人员免受公投检查和不当行为指控的影响,但需要更高的利率和行政成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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