The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption

Maxime C. Cohen, R. Lobel, G. Perakis
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引用次数: 368

Abstract

This paper studies government subsidies for green technology adoption while considering the manufacturing industry’s response. Government subsidies offered directly to consumers impact the supplier’s production and pricing decisions. Our analysis expands the current understanding of the price-setting newsvendor model, incorporating the external influence from the government, who is now an additional player in the system. We quantify how demand uncertainty impacts the various players (government, industry, and consumers) when designing policies. We further show that, for convex demand functions, an increase in demand uncertainty leads to higher production quantities and lower prices, resulting in lower profits for the supplier. With this in mind, one could expect consumer surplus to increase with uncertainty. In fact, we show that this is not always the case and that the uncertainty impact on consumer surplus depends on the trade-off between lower prices and the possibility of underserving customers with high valuations. We also show that when policy makers such as governments ignore demand uncertainty when designing consumer subsidies, they can significantly miss the desired adoption target level. From a coordination perspective, we demonstrate that the decentralized decisions are also optimal for a central planner managing jointly the supplier and the government. As a result, subsidies provide a coordination mechanism. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management .
需求不确定性对采用绿色技术的消费者补贴的影响
本文研究了政府对绿色技术采用的补贴,同时考虑了制造业的反应。政府直接向消费者提供的补贴影响了供应商的生产和定价决策。我们的分析扩展了目前对定价报贩模式的理解,纳入了来自政府的外部影响,政府现在是系统中的一个额外参与者。在设计政策时,我们量化了需求不确定性如何影响各种参与者(政府、行业和消费者)。我们进一步证明,对于凸需求函数,需求不确定性的增加导致生产数量的增加和价格的降低,从而导致供应商的利润降低。考虑到这一点,我们可以预期消费者剩余将在不确定的情况下增加。事实上,我们表明情况并非总是如此,不确定性对消费者剩余的影响取决于较低价格与高估值客户服务不足的可能性之间的权衡。我们还表明,当政府等政策制定者在设计消费者补贴时忽视需求不确定性时,他们可能会大大错过期望的采用目标水平。从协调的角度来看,我们证明了分散决策对于共同管理供应商和政府的中央计划者也是最优的。因此,补贴提供了一种协调机制。本文被运营管理专业的Yossi Aviv接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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