Chemical Castration and the Violation of Sexual Rights

Abstract

This chapter provides a philosophical analysis of the use of chemical castration as a treatment or punishment for aggravated sexual crimes. Its aim is to strip chemical castration of its various associated problems (like its history, exemplified by the Turing case). Even its philosophical analysis is limited in scope, simply attempting to answer the question: Is the use of chemical castration on perpetrators of aggravated sexual crimes a violation of their moral rights? The author concludes that there is not a compelling reason for thinking that the use of chemical castration in these circumstances is a rights violation. Certainly, the pertinent bodily rights do not belong to a category that is non-forfeitable—as might have been supposed, just because chemical castration affects people sexually. Furthermore, it is not easy to explain why the method by which chemical castration changes an individual’s desires is more intrusive or morally problematic than the ways that many stimuli might change our desires.