{"title":"The Completion of Care—The Normativity of Care","authors":"E. Kittay","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190844608.003.0010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"CARE, this chapter argues, succeeds normatively, or is “completed,” only when it is received by the cared-for as CARING. On this model, an action will count as CARE if it contributes to the well-being, restoration, or flourishing of a being or a subject. It must also be motivated by concern for the welfare of the cared-for. A carer must thus cultivate a “transparent self,” one receptive to the other’s conception of her own needs and wants. This view emphasizes that CARE is active, distinguishes it from paternalism, and indicates the role of moral luck in caring. CARING, then, is an action, and the act of caring requires that the cared-for take up and receive that action as care. The author ends by asking if there is a duty to take up care (when the cared for is capable) that is offered with competence and in good faith.","PeriodicalId":137323,"journal":{"name":"Learning from My Daughter","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Learning from My Daughter","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190844608.003.0010","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
CARE, this chapter argues, succeeds normatively, or is “completed,” only when it is received by the cared-for as CARING. On this model, an action will count as CARE if it contributes to the well-being, restoration, or flourishing of a being or a subject. It must also be motivated by concern for the welfare of the cared-for. A carer must thus cultivate a “transparent self,” one receptive to the other’s conception of her own needs and wants. This view emphasizes that CARE is active, distinguishes it from paternalism, and indicates the role of moral luck in caring. CARING, then, is an action, and the act of caring requires that the cared-for take up and receive that action as care. The author ends by asking if there is a duty to take up care (when the cared for is capable) that is offered with competence and in good faith.