{"title":"Towards a Harmonization of Insider Trading Criminal Law at EU Level?","authors":"M. Faure, C. Leger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2543964","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In June 2014 the European Council promulgated the directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57/EU forcing the European member states to criminalize particular acts related to market manipulation and insider trading. In the same month the directive also entered into force. As a result of this directive the traditional freedom that member states had to decide the ways in which they would implement a directive on market manipulation and insider trading has finished. With this important step the European institutions make use of the new powers that were allocated to them to force member states to the use of the criminal law in particular areas. Previously the European institutions made use of this inter alia with respect to environmental criminal law. However, this is the first time that the European institutions not only force member states towards criminalisation, but moreover, even impose a minimum level of specific penalties, something which was equally made possible with the treaty of Lisbon.The enclosed paper describes the way in which the European institutions have addressed the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition and the role of the criminal law in this respect. Moreover, in the paper we critically question whether criminalisation and more particularly the imposition of criminal law at EU-level are appropriate tools.In order to address those questions we use an economic approach and a legal theory approach to the criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation. Economic theory has indicated that criminalisation may only be needed in specific (exceptional) circumstances, more particularly where the gain to the perpetrator would be relatively high, the potential damage to society high and the probability of detection low. We argue that although there may be circumstances in which these conditions are fulfilled, there can also be many situations where the probability of detection is not that low and where gains to the perpetrator are not substantial. In those circumstances alternatives such as civil remedies or administrative sanctions could suffice. It is striking that the European Commission pays a lot of attention to private enforcement in other policy domains like e.g. competition policy. In the domain of enforcement of insider trading and market manipulation there is, contrary to the situation in the US, no attention to the possibilities of private enforcements. To the contrary, differently than the suggestions from economic theory, the European institutions strongly believe in the need for criminal sanctions.Not only the choice for the criminal law can be critically assessed. One can equally wonder why this criminalisation necessarily had to be imposed at EU-level. In fact, from the twenty-eight European member states only Bulgaria lacked criminal sanctions. That hence also justifies the question whether there really was a need to impose a criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation at EU-level, rather than respecting the subsidiarity principle and hence allowing member states the appropriate remedies (civil, administrative of criminal) to insider trading and market manipulation.The goal of this paper is hence to critically discuss this very recent European directive, forcing member states to a criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation from an economic perspective. The paper critically analyses the directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57/EU and also discusses the arguments in favour of criminalisation and the question whether forcing criminalisation at EU-level, as the directive does, was indicated.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2543964","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
In June 2014 the European Council promulgated the directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57/EU forcing the European member states to criminalize particular acts related to market manipulation and insider trading. In the same month the directive also entered into force. As a result of this directive the traditional freedom that member states had to decide the ways in which they would implement a directive on market manipulation and insider trading has finished. With this important step the European institutions make use of the new powers that were allocated to them to force member states to the use of the criminal law in particular areas. Previously the European institutions made use of this inter alia with respect to environmental criminal law. However, this is the first time that the European institutions not only force member states towards criminalisation, but moreover, even impose a minimum level of specific penalties, something which was equally made possible with the treaty of Lisbon.The enclosed paper describes the way in which the European institutions have addressed the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition and the role of the criminal law in this respect. Moreover, in the paper we critically question whether criminalisation and more particularly the imposition of criminal law at EU-level are appropriate tools.In order to address those questions we use an economic approach and a legal theory approach to the criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation. Economic theory has indicated that criminalisation may only be needed in specific (exceptional) circumstances, more particularly where the gain to the perpetrator would be relatively high, the potential damage to society high and the probability of detection low. We argue that although there may be circumstances in which these conditions are fulfilled, there can also be many situations where the probability of detection is not that low and where gains to the perpetrator are not substantial. In those circumstances alternatives such as civil remedies or administrative sanctions could suffice. It is striking that the European Commission pays a lot of attention to private enforcement in other policy domains like e.g. competition policy. In the domain of enforcement of insider trading and market manipulation there is, contrary to the situation in the US, no attention to the possibilities of private enforcements. To the contrary, differently than the suggestions from economic theory, the European institutions strongly believe in the need for criminal sanctions.Not only the choice for the criminal law can be critically assessed. One can equally wonder why this criminalisation necessarily had to be imposed at EU-level. In fact, from the twenty-eight European member states only Bulgaria lacked criminal sanctions. That hence also justifies the question whether there really was a need to impose a criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation at EU-level, rather than respecting the subsidiarity principle and hence allowing member states the appropriate remedies (civil, administrative of criminal) to insider trading and market manipulation.The goal of this paper is hence to critically discuss this very recent European directive, forcing member states to a criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation from an economic perspective. The paper critically analyses the directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57/EU and also discusses the arguments in favour of criminalisation and the question whether forcing criminalisation at EU-level, as the directive does, was indicated.
2014年6月,欧洲理事会颁布了2014/57/EU关于市场滥用刑事制裁的指令,迫使欧洲成员国将与市场操纵和内幕交易有关的特定行为定为刑事犯罪。同月,该指令也开始生效。这一指令的结果是,成员国必须决定以何种方式执行针对市场操纵和内幕交易的指令的传统自由终结了。通过这一重要步骤,欧洲机构利用分配给它们的新权力,迫使成员国在特定领域使用刑法。以前,欧洲各机构在环境刑法方面特别利用了这一点。然而,这是欧洲机构第一次不仅迫使成员国将其定为刑事犯罪,而且甚至施加最低限度的具体惩罚,这在《里斯本条约》(treaty of Lisbon)中同样成为可能。随附的文件描述了欧洲机构如何解决内幕交易禁令的执行问题,以及刑法在这方面的作用。此外,在本文中,我们批判性地质疑刑事定罪,特别是在欧盟层面实施刑法是否是适当的工具。为了解决这些问题,我们使用经济方法和法律理论方法来将内幕交易和市场操纵定为刑事犯罪。经济理论表明,刑事定罪可能只在特定(例外)情况下才需要,特别是在犯罪者的收益相对较高,对社会的潜在损害较高而被发现的可能性较低的情况下。我们认为,尽管可能存在满足这些条件的情况,但也可能存在许多情况,其中发现的可能性并不那么低,并且犯罪者的收益并不大。在这种情况下,民事补救或行政制裁等备选办法就足够了。令人惊讶的是,欧盟委员会对竞争政策等其他政策领域的私人执法给予了大量关注。与美国的情况相反,在内幕交易和市场操纵的执法领域,中国没有关注私人执法的可能性。相反,与经济理论的建议不同,欧洲机构强烈认为有必要实施刑事制裁。不仅刑法的选择可以被批判性地评估。人们同样会想知道,为什么这种刑事定罪必须在欧盟层面实施。事实上,在28个欧洲成员国中,只有保加利亚没有刑事制裁。因此,这也证明了这样一个问题是合理的:是否真的有必要在欧盟层面将内幕交易和市场操纵定为刑事犯罪,而不是尊重辅助原则,从而允许成员国对内幕交易和市场操纵采取适当的补救措施(民事、行政或刑事)。因此,本文的目的是批判性地讨论这一最近的欧洲指令,迫使成员国从经济角度将内幕交易和市场操纵定为刑事犯罪。本文批判性地分析了2014/57/EU关于市场滥用刑事制裁的指令,并讨论了支持刑事定罪的论点,以及是否如指令所指示的那样,在欧盟层面强制刑事定罪的问题。