Foreword - Brexit, the Courts of Justice of the EU and epignosis: a constitutional guide

Abstract

In the domain of politics, trial and error are frequent occurrences. Through trial and error we tend to discover that political decisions, policy choices and even customary ways of doing things are no longer sustainable and thus in need of revision. The need for revision is accentuated when decisions and policies harm actual persons. In such cases, justice entails not only a duty not to harm human beings but also a duty to recognise the harmful impact of decisions and policies on persons’ rights and legitimate interests. There is nothing wrong in admitting mistakes or misjudgements and changing course. The doors of perception are not always fully open for human beings; information asymmetries, errors of judgement, ideological standpoints and self-interest often lead individuals to poor visualisations of the future and thus to imprudent actions. What is wrong, and often inexcusable, is to refuse to learn from error and to let it become irreparably destructive. In political life, inertia or the suppression of new information or a simple refusal to admit error in an attempt to save face and to maintain the illusionary hope that things might just work out in the end become manifestations of poor judgement and thus of very poor and ineffective leadership. Both Advocate-General Campos Sanchez-Bordona, who delivered his opinion on the revocability of Article 50 TEU on 4 December 2018,1 and the Court of Justice of the EU, which agreed with his interpretation that the UK can revoke the notification of its intention to withdraw from the EU on Monday, 10 December 2018 unilaterally,2 essentially confirmed that trial and error are common in politics and that countries, like individuals, are entitled to change their mind.