Political Authority, Expected Consequences and Politicization of International Institutions

Abstract

A prominent argument in the politicization literature suggests that the level of politicization of an international institution is a function in particular of the extent to which political authority has been transferred to it. In this chapter, I criticize the authority-politicization-thesis as theoretically myopic and falling short of adequately explaining many empirically observable instances of politicization. Instead, I argue that politicization is better, and more comprehensively, understood as being driven by the (expected) consequences of particular governance arrangements and that the perceived significance and magnitude of such consequences need not correlate with formally delegated or recognized authority. I illustrate the argument with discussions of three types of institutions—the UN General Assembly, the G7/8/20 summits, and coalitions of the willing—each of which can be factually consequential and has triggered substantial politicization without possessing, as an institution, much recognized political authority in its own right.