The Direction of Causation

E. Brown
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The problem of the direction of causation can be discussed on two levels. We can wonder if it is in every sense necessary that a cause precedes its effects. But we can also-on a more uncommitted level-ask the following question: Whether or not retroactive causes are real or conceivable phenomena, can we put into brackets the temporal order of two events and still decide which one is cause and which one is effect? Now, evidently, if one answers the first question in the negative one has to face the second one. But this one could also be put forward in its own right. Even if it should be a necessary truth that a cause precedes its effect(s), it might be possible-and clarifying-to explore other ways of making sense of the cause-effect distinction. It is in this perspective that this article primarily should be read, since I will make no positive case for the possibility of retroactive causes. On the other hand, since I contend that a clarifying account can be given of the cause-effect distinction, independently of relying on the temporal order of two events, the article might also be read as a prolegomenon to a discussion of the possibility of retroactive causes. To accept that a causal process has a direction seems tantamount to accepting that it uniformly flows from cause to effect. It could not possibly flow in the opposite direction. One way of giving an initial precision to this idea of an asymmetrical causal direction is to say that it is the cause which by necessity explains the occurrence of its effect-in the sense that we would never consider a the cause of b if we maintained that b explained the occurrence of a. But of course, connecting the distinction between cause and effect with that between explanans and explanandum cannot be of any great help in really clarifying the first distinction. That an event explains the occurrence of another event amounts to little more than a mere verbal paraphrase of saying that the first one is the cause of the second one. Let us, however, ask a somewhat different question: How do we explain
因果关系的方向
因果关系的方向问题可以从两个层面来讨论。我们可以想知道,在任何意义上,原因先于结果是否都是必要的。但我们也可以——在一个更不确定的层面上——问以下问题:无论追溯的原因是否真实或可想象的现象,我们是否可以把两个事件的时间顺序放在括号里,仍然决定哪个是原因,哪个是结果?显然,如果一个人对第一个问题的回答是否定的那么他就必须面对第二个问题。但这个问题也可以单独提出。即使“因先于其果”是必然的真理,也有可能探索其他方法来解释因果区别。这篇文章主要应该从这个角度来阅读,因为我不会对追溯原因的可能性进行积极的论证。另一方面,由于我认为可以独立于两个事件的时间顺序,对因果区别进行澄清,因此这篇文章也可以被解读为对追溯原因可能性的讨论的序言。接受因果过程有方向,似乎就等于接受因果过程从因流向果的一致性。它不可能朝相反的方向流动。给一个初始精度这一想法的一种方式的不对称的因果方向是说它是由必要的原因解释了发生的影响,我们不会考虑如果我们坚持认为b的原因解释了发生的。当然,连接之间的区别与词的意义和待解释事物之间的因果关系不能被任何伟大的帮助真的澄清第一的区别。一件事解释了另一件事的发生,这只不过是对前一件事是后一件事的原因的口头解释。然而,让我们问一个有点不同的问题:我们如何解释
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