Can National Governments Be Responsible in a World of Interdependence?

Abstract

This paper expands the conventional model of responsible party government to take into account the effect of trans-national constraints on nationally elected governments. It starts by systematically comparing the closed model of national party government with that of a governing party subject to the constraints of a world of interdependence. European Union constraints concurrently exert a denationalizing influence through the Council, a multinational effect through the European Parliament, and an aspiring economic technocracy. Interdependence is increased in institutions of a wider Europe or global in scope, and trans-national influences of markets and non-state crime can operate without any formal institution being accountable or in control. As an alternative to electorates rotating their choice between a succession of parties that fail to meet national preference, the conclusion proposes a learning model by which parties and voters may adapt expectations to meet the constraints of interdependence.