A Novel EMI Attack Exploiting the Control Vulnerability of Photovoltaic Inverters

Zihao Dan, Fengchen Yang, Kaikai Pan, Chen Yan, Xiaoyu Ji, Wenyuan Xu
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Abstract

With the rapid development of distributed generation(DG), the penetration rate of photovoltaics(PVs) in the power grid continues to increase. Therefore, various security issues faced by PV inverters have also become a major challenge to ensure the stability of the power grid.Due to the complex and open environment of PVs, attackers are more likely to access key devices such as grid-tied inverters, thereby causing damage to the entire power grid. Taking advantage of the above characteristics, this paper proposes a novel electromagnetic interference(EMI) attack against inverters, instead of cyber attacks that have been explored well in many other research works. It injects a bias signal into the PV inverter sensor through EMI, so as to change the sensor value finally transmitted to the controller. An attacker can tamper with the sensor value in this way. This paper also analyzes the vulnerability in the inverter control algorithm, and exploits the vulnerability to cause damage to the inverter through EMI attacks.The attack was verified on a commercial inverter from Texas Instruments. We present the induced DC voltage offset corresponding to different EMI frequencies of different sensors to demonstrate that EMI attacks can independently control different sensors on the inverter. In addition, we also analyze the inverter control algorithm and the possible consequences of attacks, further evaluate the consequences of the attack through simulations (we do simulations instead of real device tests to ensure safety). And the results show that this novel attack can shut down/burn the PV inverter.
随着分布式发电(DG)的快速发展,光伏在电网中的渗透率不断提高。因此,光伏逆变器所面临的各种安全问题也成为保障电网稳定的重大挑战。由于光伏的复杂开放环境,攻击者更容易接触到并网逆变器等关键设备,从而对整个电网造成破坏。利用上述特点,本文提出了一种针对逆变器的新型电磁干扰(EMI)攻击,取代了许多其他研究工作中已经探索得很好的网络攻击。它通过电磁干扰向光伏逆变器传感器中注入偏置信号,从而改变传感器的值,最终传输给控制器。攻击者可以通过这种方式篡改传感器值。本文还分析了逆变器控制算法中的漏洞,并利用该漏洞通过电磁干扰攻击对逆变器造成破坏。攻击在德州仪器的商用逆变器上得到了验证。我们给出了不同传感器的不同电磁干扰频率对应的感应直流电压偏移,以证明电磁干扰攻击可以独立控制逆变器上的不同传感器。此外,我们还分析了逆变器的控制算法和攻击可能造成的后果,并通过仿真进一步评估攻击的后果(我们做仿真而不是真实的设备测试,以确保安全)。结果表明,这种新型攻击可以使光伏逆变器关闭/烧毁。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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