Research on the manufacturers' channel selection strategy

H. Liu, Zhiping Wang
{"title":"Research on the manufacturers' channel selection strategy","authors":"H. Liu, Zhiping Wang","doi":"10.1109/ICITM.2018.8333929","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper studied the issue of the NDSC (network direct sales channel) for manufacturers with the retailer-led Stackelberg game in a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer not only has traditional sales channel, but also has network sales channel. Through the numerical analysis, following conclusions were obtained. if the NDSC is opened, the retailers' profit will decrease, and the manufacturers' profit will increase at a reasonable wholesale price. Furthermore, NDSC won't improve the efficiency of the supply chain system, and the contract of wholesale price discount and sales effort cost sharing also won't give a Pareto improvement for bilateral profits.","PeriodicalId":341512,"journal":{"name":"2018 7th International Conference on Industrial Technology and Management (ICITM)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2018 7th International Conference on Industrial Technology and Management (ICITM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICITM.2018.8333929","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper studied the issue of the NDSC (network direct sales channel) for manufacturers with the retailer-led Stackelberg game in a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer not only has traditional sales channel, but also has network sales channel. Through the numerical analysis, following conclusions were obtained. if the NDSC is opened, the retailers' profit will decrease, and the manufacturers' profit will increase at a reasonable wholesale price. Furthermore, NDSC won't improve the efficiency of the supply chain system, and the contract of wholesale price discount and sales effort cost sharing also won't give a Pareto improvement for bilateral profits.
厂商渠道选择策略研究
本文利用零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈,研究了一个制造商和零售商组成的供应链中,零售商既有传统销售渠道,又有网络销售渠道的制造商的网络直销渠道问题。通过数值分析,得到以下结论:如果NDSC开放,零售商的利润会减少,而制造商的利润会在合理的批发价格下增加。此外,NDSC不会提高供应链系统的效率,批发价格折扣和销售努力成本分担的合同也不会给双方利润带来帕累托改进。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信