Must Mutual Recognition Transform into Mutually Assured Obstruction? Three Creative Suggestions for the UK's Brexit Negotiators

Richard Lang
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Abstract

On 2nd October 2016, Theresa May gave the clearest indication yet that the UK will be leaving not only the European Union, but the European Economic Area too, finding herself outside “Fortress Europe” altogether. Thus while Brexit might offer exciting opportunities for the British to “go it alone”, setting our own standards, this would have the effect of excluding non-compliant EU goods and services from the British market, and would likely be answered by the remaining 27 Member States in kind: any barriers to trade erected on our side, whether tariff or non-tariff, will simply be met by equal and opposite barriers on the other. Even if a UK-EU Free Trade Area is negotiated, removing the threat of tariffs themselves, the remaining 27 Member States will be free to impose quotas on British goods, or indeed “measures having equivalent effect” (regulatory barriers), without fear of censure from the Court of Justice as in the past. The Court’s classic doctrine of “mutual recognition” will serve no further purpose. The situation will be, as the present author has described it elsewhere, one of “Mutually Assured Obstruction”. This paper postulates three alternative doctrines that our Brexit negotiators might consider as they draft a Withdrawal Treaty, which might leave some scope for liberalization on both sides of the Fortress wall, but at the same time remaining true to the spirit of Brexit, and not simply undoing it “in the small print”. These alternatives are based, respectively, on the concepts of obversion, unilateralism and tripartism.
相互承认必须转变为相互保证的阻碍吗?给英国脱欧谈判代表的三个创造性建议
2016年10月2日,特蕾莎·梅给出了迄今为止最明确的暗示,即英国不仅将离开欧盟,还将离开欧洲经济区,发现自己完全脱离了“欧洲堡垒”。因此,尽管英国脱欧可能会为英国人提供“单干”、制定自己的标准的令人兴奋的机会,但这将产生将不合规的欧盟商品和服务排除在英国市场之外的效果,并且可能会得到其余27个成员国的回应:任何在我们这边建立的贸易壁垒,无论是关税还是非关税,都将被另一方平等和相反的壁垒所应对。即使英欧自由贸易区谈判成功,消除了关税本身的威胁,其余27个成员国也可以自由地对英国商品施加配额,或者实际上是“具有同等效果的措施”(监管壁垒),而不必像过去那样担心受到法院的谴责。法院“相互承认”的经典原则将不再适用。正如本作者在其他地方所描述的那样,这种情况将是一种“相互保证的阻碍”。本文假设了英国脱欧谈判代表在起草脱欧条约时可能会考虑的三种替代理论,这可能会在堡垒墙的两侧留下一些自由化的空间,但同时保持对英国脱欧精神的忠诚,而不是简单地“在小字上”取消它。这些备选方案分别基于回避、单边主义和三方主义的概念。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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