Shaping the Size of Nations: A Test of the Determinants of Secessions

Abstract

Little is known about the empirical determinants of state formation and dissolution, despite a rich theoretical literature on the subject. This paper attempts to fill that gap by treating the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a historical experiment in state breakup. I exploit regional variation in separatist protests across the 184 provinces of the Union to measure a demand for secession. This allows for a test of economic theories predicting that the incentive to secede should be determined by the trade-off between the cost of public goods provision and preference heterogeneity. I find strong evidence for the existence of this trade-off in shaping demand for secession. Similarly, I find that economic theory is to some extent able to predict the extent to which regional elites are actually pursuing a separatist policy. However, I also show that the popular demand for secession had little causal effect on actual separatist policy once exogenous variation in the propensity to protest is taken into account.