A Financial Capitalism Perspective on Start-Up Acquisitions: Introducing the Economic Goodwill Test

A. McLean
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper discusses the acquisition of start-ups by major technology firms. Such transactions pose a significant anticompetitive threat, yet often escape competition scrutiny because they fail to trigger merger notification threshold tests. Alongside a financial analysis of historic acquisitions by Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft, the paper introduces a new threshold test—the economic goodwill test. The economic goodwill test is a concerned with the value of a target’s net tangible assets as a proportion of total transaction value. The difference between these figures largely represents the gains an acquirer expects to realise from a strengthened competitive position, therefore reflecting the logic driving the mass acquisition of technology start-ups. Although a specific triggering figure is not prescribed, the economic goodwill test represents a useful innovation that could bring potentially anticompetitive start-up acquisitions under substantive merger review. More broadly, the paper argues start-up acquisitions are representative of the difficulties that competition law faces governing economic activity in the era of financial capitalism. The modern financial system creates a strong bridge between the present and the distant future. This enables firms to engage in future-oriented competitive strategies that challenge competition law’s static approach.
初创企业收购的金融资本主义视角:引入经济商誉测试
本文讨论了大型科技公司对初创企业的收购。这类交易构成了重大的反竞争威胁,但由于未能触发合并通知门槛测试,它们往往能逃脱竞争审查。除了对bb0、苹果、Facebook、亚马逊和微软的历史性收购进行财务分析外,本文还引入了一个新的门槛测试——经济商誉测试。经济商誉测试关注的是目标公司有形资产净值占交易总额的比例。这些数字之间的差异在很大程度上代表了收购方希望从加强的竞争地位中实现的收益,因此反映了推动大规模收购科技初创企业的逻辑。虽然没有规定具体的触发数字,但经济商誉测试代表了一项有用的创新,可能使潜在的反竞争初创企业收购受到实质性合并审查。更广泛地说,这篇论文认为,初创企业收购代表了金融资本主义时代竞争法管理经济活动所面临的困难。现代金融体系在现在和遥远的未来之间架起了一座坚固的桥梁。这使公司能够从事面向未来的竞争战略,挑战竞争法的静态方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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