The Clan and the Corporation: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe

A. Greif, G. Tabellini
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引用次数: 192

Abstract

Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines – analytically and historically – the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.
家族与公司:中欧合作的持续发展
在过去的千年里,家族和公司分别是中国和欧洲的合作场所。本文分析和历史地考察了导致这种分歧的文化和制度的共同演变。我们强调,个人认同的群体是合作的基本单位。这种忠诚群体影响制度发展,因为群体内的道德承诺降低了执行成本,这意味着在追求集体行动方面具有比较优势。忠诚群体的延续是由于道德、制度和隐含的合作模式之间的积极反馈。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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