The Remarkable 10th Anniversary of Stuxnet

Gábor Selján
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Abstract

It has been ten years since Stuxnet, a highly sophisticated malware that was originally aimed at Iran’s nuclear facilities, was uncovered in 2010. Stuxnet is considered to be the first cyber weapon, used by a nation state threat actor in a politically motivated cyberattack. It has significantly changed the cybersecurity landscape, since it was the first publicly known malware that could cause physical damage to real processes or equipment. Its complexity and level of sophistication, due to the exploitation of four different zero-day vulnerabilities in Windows and the usage of two stolen certificates, has triggered a paradigm shift in the cybersecurity industry. The recently uncovered cyber espionage campaign known as SolarStorm is a worthy anniversary celebration for Stuxnet. Especially because now the tables have turned. This campaign targeted the United States Government and its interests with a highly sophisticated supply chain attack through the exploitation of the SolarWinds Orion Platform used by thousands of public and private sector customers for infrastructure monitoring and management. In this article, I attempt to summarise the key points about the malware deployed in the SolarStorm campaign that can be drawn from reports available at the time of the writing.
非凡的震网十周年纪念
自2010年发现最初针对伊朗核设施的高度复杂的恶意软件Stuxnet以来,已经过去了10年。Stuxnet被认为是第一种网络武器,由民族国家威胁行为者用于政治动机的网络攻击。它极大地改变了网络安全格局,因为它是第一个公开的恶意软件,可以对实际过程或设备造成物理损坏。由于利用了Windows中四个不同的零日漏洞和使用两个被盗证书,它的复杂性和复杂程度引发了网络安全行业的范式转变。最近被发现的网络间谍活动SolarStorm是Stuxnet值得庆祝的周年纪念活动。尤其是现在形势已经逆转了。这次活动的目标是美国政府及其利益,通过利用SolarWinds猎户座平台进行高度复杂的供应链攻击,该平台被数千个公共和私营部门客户用于基础设施监测和管理。在本文中,我试图总结关于SolarStorm活动中部署的恶意软件的关键点,这些关键点可以从撰写本文时可用的报告中得出。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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