Analysis of Listed Companies' Share Ownership Structures and Patterns of Tender Offers

Hiroyuki Watanabe
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Abstract

Understanding of the entire picture of the share ownership structure of listed companies in each country in general will provide an important perspective for analyzing the present takeover rules in that country, and also for considering appropriate regimes for takeover rules for the future. This perspective is absolutely necessary from the standpoint of policymaking. Based on the awareness of the issue as mentioned above, I made an analysis of (i) the distribution of the shareholding ratios of the largest shareholders (Table 1), and (ii) the average shareholding ratios of the largest shareholders/second to tenth-ranked shareholders (Table 2) based on the latest data available as of April 30, 2013, so as to study the share ownership structure of listed companies in five countries, i.e. Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France. I also made an analysis of selected cases of tender offers of each country. The divergence between the mandatory offer rules and the patterns of tender offer models in the U.K., Germany and France, provides an important insight for legislative policies, as it suggests the following facts, in addition to the basic patterns of different share ownership structure models and tender offers: (i) even the same rules function differently depending on differences in the share ownership structure; and (ii) even a slight difference in the related regulations makes the rules function differently, if the share ownership structure is different.
上市公司股权结构与要约收购模式分析
了解每个国家上市公司股权结构的整体情况,将为分析该国目前的收购规则提供一个重要的视角,也将为考虑未来收购规则的适当制度提供一个重要的视角。从政策制定的角度来看,这种观点是绝对必要的。基于上述对问题的认识,我根据截至2013年4月30日的最新数据,分析了(I)第一大股东持股比例分布(表1)和(ii)第一大股东/排名第二至第十的股东的平均持股比例(表2),从而研究了日本、美国、英国、德国和法国五国上市公司的股权结构。并对各国招标报价的选定案例进行了分析。英、德、法三国强制性收购规则与要约收购模式之间的差异,为立法政策提供了重要的启示,除了不同股权结构模式和要约收购的基本模式外,还揭示了以下事实:(1)即使相同的规则,也会因股权结构的不同而发挥不同的作用;(二)在股权结构不同的情况下,即使相关规定略有不同,也会导致规则的作用不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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