The dynamic competitive strategy study of duopoly enterprises in the Low-carbon Emission policy regulation

Abstract

The study is based on the “dynamic game of perfect information” theory and the Stackelberg leadership model-investment in green technology. In the regulation of Mandatory Carbon Emissions Capacity, cap-and-trade and Carbon Emission Tax, this paper discusses the production-pricing decision and Nash equilibrium of enterprises that are not well-matched in strength in the dynamic game of perfect information, which prove two enterprises, under different policies, can come up with the optimum strategies and get corresponding expected profits, And Obtain the relations for Dynamic competitive strategies between market leader and followers, comparing the decisions under different Low-carbon Emission policies to analyze the environmental benefit and economical benefit. The results of this study manifests: Low-carbon Emission policy affects all the optimum strategies and expected profits of duopoly enterprises. And the further study proves the Mandatory Carbon Emissions Capacity and Cap-and-Trade have far greater impact on the expected profits of the enterprises, thus leading that expected profits is more indeterminate.