{"title":"THE NECESSARILY ASSUMED MEANING OF THE LEGISLATIVE TEXT (IQTIḌĀUN-NAṢṢ) IN ḤANAFĪ LEGAL SCHOOL","authors":"Šukrija Ramić","doi":"10.51728/issn.2637-1480.2018.45","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The work on iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ explores the theoretical interpretations of Ḥanafi scholars in relation to the necessarily assumed meaning of the legislative text (iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ) and the consequences of such an interpretation on the regulations to which the Ḥanafis came in their legal reasoning (ijtihād). At the beginning of the paper, the linguistic and terminological definition of the concept of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the Ḥanafi Law School is considered. Through the examples of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ it is explained that the Ḥanafis used iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the argumentation of legal regulations. Furthermore, the status of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the Ḥanafi Law School, and the way of giving preference in the case of contradiction between iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ and other indications are clarified. At the end of this paper, the basic results of this research are presented.","PeriodicalId":246084,"journal":{"name":"Zbornik radova 16","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zbornik radova 16","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.51728/issn.2637-1480.2018.45","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The work on iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ explores the theoretical interpretations of Ḥanafi scholars in relation to the necessarily assumed meaning of the legislative text (iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ) and the consequences of such an interpretation on the regulations to which the Ḥanafis came in their legal reasoning (ijtihād). At the beginning of the paper, the linguistic and terminological definition of the concept of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the Ḥanafi Law School is considered. Through the examples of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ it is explained that the Ḥanafis used iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the argumentation of legal regulations. Furthermore, the status of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the Ḥanafi Law School, and the way of giving preference in the case of contradiction between iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ and other indications are clarified. At the end of this paper, the basic results of this research are presented.