Theory of Quiddity Preparedness by Ibn ‘Arabī and its Relation to the Negation of Determinism of Servants

Abstract

The issue of servants’ acts is one of the most controversial issues in Islamic thought and helped to sharpen the characteristics and differences between theological schools, mainly due to its relation to taklīf and servants’ responsibility. Therefore, understandings of this issue revealed differences in understandings of divine justice and wisdom, as well as in interpretations of fate and destiny. One of the noteworthy theories is that of Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) and his followers, who attempted to establish responsibility and negate the determinism of servants through al-a‘yān al-thābita (fixed entities) and ʻadam maj‘ūliyat al-mahiya (un-createdness of quiddities). They also focused on the construction of fate and destiny in accordance with this theory and considered such construction to constitute “the secret of destiny” and “the absolute proof” of God over the peoples. While studying the servants’ acts and the extent of their freedom of choice, we must deal with the issue of fate and destiny, as nothing in this universe is beyond fate and destiny. Human beings and their voluntary acts are no more than a part of this fate. We, therefore, first set out to understand the meaning of fate and destiny as understood by Ibn Arabi in this article. Then, we clarify the meaning of al-a‘yān al-thābita. Next, we detail the issue of createdness of quiddities; as the universal entities are no more than realities and quiddities, we then tackle the issue of preparedness of quiddity and its relation to the establishment of the servant’s freedom and the negation of determinism. Finally, we explore criticisms of this theory and try to present an objective evaluation of opinions on the issue.