System on Chip (SoC) Security Architecture Framework for Isolated Domains Against Threats

Siam Haque, Shahnam Mirzaei
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Abstract

This paper presents a definition of a secure system and design principles, which help govern security policies within an embedded system. By understanding a secure system, a common system on chip (SoC) architecture is evaluated and their vulnerabilities explored. This effort helped define requirements for a framework for a secure and isolated SoC architecture for users to develop in. Throughout this paper, a SoC architecture framework for isolated domains has been proposed and its robustness verified against different attack scenarios. To support different levels of criticality and complexity in developing user applications, three computing domains were proposed: security and safety critical (SSC) domain, high performance (HP) domain, and sandbox domain. These domains allow for complex applications to be realized with varying levels of security. Isolation between different computing domains is established using consumer off the shelf (COTS) techniques and architectural components provided by the Zynq Ultrascale+ (ZU+) multiprocessor SoC (MPSoC). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that implements a secure system design on the ZU+ platform. There have been many other implementations in hardware security to mitigate certain attack scenarios such as side channel attacks, temporal attacks, hardware trojans, etc. However, our work is different than others, as it establishes the framework for isolated computing domains for secure applications and also verifies system security by attacking one domain from the others.
针对威胁的隔离域SoC安全架构框架
本文给出了安全系统的定义和设计原则,有助于管理嵌入式系统内的安全策略。通过了解安全系统,评估了通用片上系统(SoC)架构并探索了其漏洞。这项工作有助于为用户开发的安全和隔离的SoC架构定义框架的需求。本文提出了一种针对隔离域的SoC架构框架,并验证了其对不同攻击场景的鲁棒性。为了支持开发用户应用程序的不同级别的临界性和复杂性,提出了三个计算域:安全和安全关键(SSC)域、高性能(HP)域和沙盒域。这些域允许使用不同的安全级别来实现复杂的应用程序。不同计算域之间的隔离是使用消费者现成(COTS)技术和Zynq Ultrascale+ (ZU+)多处理器SoC (MPSoC)提供的架构组件建立的。据我们所知,这是第一个在ZU+平台上实现安全系统设计的工作。在硬件安全方面已经有许多其他实现来减轻某些攻击场景,如侧信道攻击、临时攻击、硬件木马等。然而,我们的工作与其他人不同,因为它为安全应用程序建立了隔离计算域的框架,并且还通过从一个域攻击其他域来验证系统安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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