Autonomous Vehicle Market Design

Zhen Lian, G. V. van Ryzin
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We develop an economic model of autonomous vehicle (AV) ride-hailing markets in which uncertain aggregate demand is served with a combination of a fixed fleet of AVs and an unlimited potential supply of human drivers (HVs). We analyze market outcomes under two dispatch platform designs (common platform vs. independent platforms) and two levels of AV competition (monopoly AV vs. competitive AV). A key result of our analysis is that the lower cost of AVs does not necessarily translate into lower prices; the price impact of AVs is ambiguous and depends critically on both the dispatch platform design and the level of competition. In the extreme case, we show if AVs and HVs operate on independent dispatch platforms and there is a monopoly AVs supplier, then prices are even higher than they are in a pure HV market. When AVs are introduced on a common dispatch platform, we show that whether the equilibrium price is reduced depends on the level of AV competition. If AVs are owned by a monopoly firm, then the equilibrium price is the same as in a pure HV market. In fact, the only market design that leads to unambiguously lower prices in all demand scenarios is when AVs and HVs operate on a common dispatch platform and the AV supply is competitive. Our results illustrate the critical role market design and competition plays in realizing potential welfare gains from AVs.
自动驾驶汽车市场设计
我们开发了一个自动驾驶汽车(AV)叫车市场的经济模型,其中不确定的总需求由固定的自动驾驶汽车车队和无限潜在的人类司机(hv)的组合来满足。我们分析了两种调度平台设计(公共平台与独立平台)和两种自动驾驶汽车竞争水平(垄断自动驾驶汽车与竞争自动驾驶汽车)下的市场结果。我们分析的一个关键结果是,自动驾驶汽车的低成本并不一定意味着更低的价格;自动驾驶汽车的价格影响是模糊的,主要取决于调度平台的设计和竞争水平。在极端情况下,我们表明,如果自动驾驶汽车和HV在独立的调度平台上运行,并且存在垄断的自动驾驶汽车供应商,那么价格甚至高于纯HV市场。当在公共调度平台上引入自动驾驶汽车时,我们证明了均衡价格是否降低取决于自动驾驶汽车的竞争水平。如果av为垄断企业所有,那么均衡价格与纯HV市场相同。事实上,在所有需求场景中,唯一能导致价格明显降低的市场设计是当自动驾驶汽车和hv在一个共同的调度平台上运行,并且自动驾驶汽车的供应具有竞争力。我们的研究结果表明,市场设计和竞争在实现自动驾驶汽车的潜在福利收益方面发挥着关键作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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