Game Theoretic Study of Cooperative Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Abstract

In this paper, a novel property-right spectrum leasing solution based on Stackelberg game is proposed for Cognitive Radio Networks CRN, where part of the secondary users present probabilistic dishonest behavior. In this model, the Primary User PU as the spectrum owner allows the Secondary User SU to access the shared spectrum for a fraction of time in exchange for providing cooperative relaying service by the SU. A reputation based mechanism is proposed that enables the PU to monitor the cooperative behavior of the SUs and restrict its search space at each time slot to the secondary users that do not present dishonest behavior in the proceeding time slots. The proposed reputation-based solution outperforms the classical Stackelberg games from both primary and reliable secondary users' perspectives. This novel method of filtering out unreliable users increases the PU's expected utility over consecutive time slots and also encourages the SUs to follow the game rule.