A Hybrid Incentive Mechanism for Decentralized Federated Learning

Minfeng Qi, Ziyuan Wang, Shiping Chen, Yang Xiang
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) presents a privacy-compliant approach by sharing model parameters instead of raw data. However, how to motivate data owners to participate in and stay within an FL ecosystem by continuously contributing their data to the FL model remains a challenge. In this article, we propose a hybrid incentive mechanism based on blockchain to address the above challenge. The proposed mechanism comprises two primary smart contract-based modules, namely the reputation module and the reverse auction module. The former is used to dynamically calculate the reputation score of each FL participant. It employs a trust-jointed reputation scheme to balance the weights between trust values of parameters and bid prices. The latter is responsible for initiating FL auction tasks, calculating price rankings, and assigning corresponding token rewards. Experiments are conducted to evaluate the feasibility and performance of the proposed mechanism against the three typical threats. Experimental results indicate that our mechanism can successfully reduce incentive costs while preventing participants from colluding and over-bidding in the data sharing auction.
分散联邦学习的混合激励机制
联邦学习(FL)通过共享模型参数而不是原始数据提供了一种符合隐私的方法。然而,如何通过不断向FL模型贡献数据来激励数据所有者参与并留在FL生态系统中仍然是一个挑战。在本文中,我们提出了一种基于区块链的混合激励机制来解决上述挑战。提出的机制包括两个主要的基于智能合约的模块,即信誉模块和反向拍卖模块。前者用于动态计算每个FL参与者的声誉分数。它采用信任联合信誉方案来平衡参数的信任值和投标价格之间的权重。后者负责启动FL拍卖任务,计算价格排名,并分配相应的代币奖励。通过实验来评估所提出的机制在三种典型威胁下的可行性和性能。实验结果表明,该机制可以有效地降低激励成本,同时防止数据共享拍卖中参与者串通和超竞价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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