On a Game Theoretic Approach to Detect the Low-Rate Denial of Service Attacks

P. Cotae, Rashed Rabie
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The Low-Rate DoS attacks such as “Shrew” and “New Shrew” attacks, unlike the high rate attacks, are hard for the router to detect. Attackers choose a malicious low-rate bandwidth to exploit the TCP's congestion control window algorithm and the transition time-out mechanism. By using a game theoretic approach, we focus on the best strategy and solution for a computer network to detect the Low-Rate Denial of Service attacks. In our experiments we simulated the network congestion attacks and we proposed a practical solution by using a sigmoid filter. The proposed solution is to create a threshold bandwidth filter at the router that allows a specific bandwidth, so when traffic exceeds the threshold it will be dropped, or if the traffic is below the threshold, it will be redirected to a honeypot server. In our game theory approach, we considered the game players in a static simultaneous game. The defender's strategy is to determine an optimal firewall option to detect the attacker traffic, and the attacker's strategy is to find the low rate to exploit the retransmission time-out mechanism and elude the detector. We calculated the payoff for the each player and for each strategy. We solved the game by finding the Nash Equilibrium where players do not have any profit in using any other strategy. Our experiments and calculations lead to the conclusion that a mixed strategy will the best response for an organization which will be using the proposed approach.
一种检测低速率拒绝服务攻击的博弈论方法
“鼩鼱”和“新鼩鼱”等低速率DoS攻击与高速率攻击不同,路由器很难检测到。攻击者选择恶意的低速率带宽,利用TCP的拥塞控制窗口算法和过渡超时机制。利用博弈论的方法,研究了计算机网络检测低速率拒绝服务攻击的最佳策略和解决方案。在我们的实验中,我们模拟了网络拥塞攻击,并提出了一个实用的解决方案,即使用s型滤波器。建议的解决方案是在路由器上创建一个允许特定带宽的阈值带宽过滤器,这样当流量超过阈值时,它将被丢弃,或者如果流量低于阈值,它将被重定向到蜜罐服务器。在我们的博弈论方法中,我们将游戏玩家视为静态同步游戏。防御者的策略是确定一个最优的防火墙选项来检测攻击者的流量,而攻击者的策略是找到一个低速率来利用重传超时机制并避开检测器。我们计算了每个参与者和每种策略的收益。我们通过寻找纳什均衡来解决这个博弈,在纳什均衡中,玩家使用任何其他策略都没有任何利润。我们的实验和计算得出的结论是,混合策略将是使用所提出方法的组织的最佳反应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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