The paradox of justice: Notes on the infinite, relative call

Abstract

Odysseus Makridis's (2003) essay, "Is a Levinasian Theory of Justice Possible: A Response to Murray," offers a sustained and compelling challenge to my hypothesization of a phenomenology of justice (Murray, 2003a). Makridis's analysis smartly begins by breaking down the question of whether a theory of justice is possible into several distinct preliminary questions and issues. Among these many points of discussion are the following four important questions, reviewed here in logical order. Makridis wonders first if a phenomenology of ethics is possible. If it is, he wonders second if a theory of ethics is subsequently possible. Makridis asks third if a phenomenology of justice is possible. If it is, he asks fourth if a theory of justice is subsequently possible. In short, Makridis (2003) probes the central presumption of my essay (Murray, 2003a) far more deeply than I had. Acquittingly, my essay's goal was to explore the communicative implications of a phenomenology of justice rather than prove its existence. In any case, the more fundamental question of whether a phenomenology of justice is even possible requires more careful attention. The following essay, then, endeavors to present a stronger and more thorough case for both a phenomenology of justice and, subsequently, a theory of justice. In so doing, it will address in turn the four aforementioned questions.