Forever and Again

Alexey Turchin
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Abstract

This article explores theoretical conditions necessary for “quantum immortality” (QI) as well as its possible practical implications. It is demonstrated that QI is a particular case of “multiverse immortality” (MI), which is based on two main assumptions: the very large size of the universe (not necessarily because of quantum effects); and a copy-friendly theory of personal identity. It is shown that a popular objection about lowering of the world-share (measure) of an observer in the case of QI does not succeed, as the world-share decline could be compensated by merging timelines for the simpler minds, and because some types of personal preferences are not dependent on such changes. Despite large uncertainty about the truth of MI, it has appreciable practical consequences for some important outcomes like suicide and aging. The article demonstrates that MI could be used to significantly increase the expected subjective probability of success of risky life extension technologies, such as cryonics, but that it makes euthanasia impractical because of the risk of eternal suffering. Euthanasia should be replaced with cryothanasia, i.e. cryopreservation after voluntary death. Another possible application of MI is as a last chance to survive a global catastrophe. MI could be considered a Plan D for reaching immortality, where Plan A consists of survival until the development of beneficial Artificial Intelligence capable of fighting aging, Plan B employs cryonics, and Plan C is digital immortality.
永永远远
本文探讨了“量子不朽”的理论条件及其可能的实际意义。它证明了QI是“多元宇宙不朽”(MI)的一个特例,它基于两个主要假设:宇宙非常大(不一定是因为量子效应);以及对复制友好的个人同一性理论。这表明,在QI的情况下,关于降低观察者的世界份额(测量)的流行反对意见并不成功,因为世界份额的下降可以通过合并简单思维的时间线来补偿,并且因为某些类型的个人偏好不依赖于这种变化。尽管心肌梗死的真实性存在很大的不确定性,但它对一些重要的结果(如自杀和衰老)有明显的实际影响。这篇文章表明,心肌梗死可以用来显著提高有风险的延长生命技术(如人体冷冻)成功的预期主观概率,但由于有永久痛苦的风险,它使安乐死变得不切实际。安乐死应该被低温冷冻取代,即在自愿死亡后进行低温保存。人工智能的另一个可能应用是作为在全球灾难中生存的最后机会。人工智能可以被认为是实现永生的D计划,其中a计划包括生存到能够对抗衰老的有益人工智能的发展,B计划采用人体冷冻技术,C计划是数字永生。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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