{"title":"Animal rights – Jewish perspectives","authors":"Ronen Pinkas","doi":"10.53100/bvnmxbhgbhgjb","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article raises the question why is it that, despite Jewish tradition devoting\n much thought to the status and treatment of animals and showing strict adherence to the\n notion of preventing their pain and suffering, ethical attitudes to animals are not\n dealt with systematically in the writings of Jewish philosophers and have not received\n sufficient attention in the context of moral monotheism. What has prevented the\n expansion of the golden rule: »Love your fellow as yourself: I am the LORD« (Lev 19,18)\n and »That which is hateful to you do not do to another« (BT Shabbat 31a:6; JT Nedarim\n 30b:1) to animals? Why is it that the moral responsibility for the fellow-man, the\n neighbor, or the other, has been understood as referring only to a human companion? Does\n the demand for absolute moral responsibility spoken from the face of the other, which\n Emmanuel Levinas emphasized in his ethics, not radiate from the face of the non-human\n other as well? Levinas’s ethics explicitly negates the principle of reciprocity and\n moral symmetry: The ›I‹ is committed to the other, regardless of the other’s attitude\n towards him. Does the affinity to the eternal Thou which Martin Buber also discovers in\n plants and animals not require a paradigmatic change in the attitude towards\n animals?","PeriodicalId":222541,"journal":{"name":"The Turn - Zeitschrift fuer islamische Philosophie, Theologie und\n Mystik","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Turn - Zeitschrift fuer islamische Philosophie, Theologie und\n Mystik","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53100/bvnmxbhgbhgjb","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article raises the question why is it that, despite Jewish tradition devoting
much thought to the status and treatment of animals and showing strict adherence to the
notion of preventing their pain and suffering, ethical attitudes to animals are not
dealt with systematically in the writings of Jewish philosophers and have not received
sufficient attention in the context of moral monotheism. What has prevented the
expansion of the golden rule: »Love your fellow as yourself: I am the LORD« (Lev 19,18)
and »That which is hateful to you do not do to another« (BT Shabbat 31a:6; JT Nedarim
30b:1) to animals? Why is it that the moral responsibility for the fellow-man, the
neighbor, or the other, has been understood as referring only to a human companion? Does
the demand for absolute moral responsibility spoken from the face of the other, which
Emmanuel Levinas emphasized in his ethics, not radiate from the face of the non-human
other as well? Levinas’s ethics explicitly negates the principle of reciprocity and
moral symmetry: The ›I‹ is committed to the other, regardless of the other’s attitude
towards him. Does the affinity to the eternal Thou which Martin Buber also discovers in
plants and animals not require a paradigmatic change in the attitude towards
animals?